Information Affecting Behavior in a Repeated Linear Public Goods Game

Abstract: This study examines people’s decision-making in a repeated linear public good game and how it would change over time. Specifically, there are three subject groups (A, B, and C) with group A being the control group. More information was provided to the participants of group B, and less to group C. The results show that being able to see others’ contributions does lead to less contribution, while uncertainty leads to contributing more. The rate of change of these contributions is shown to be slightly different.

Asymmetric Information in Dictator Games

Abstract: This paper seeks to better understand the impacts of shame and asymmetric information on behavior in dictator games. By withholding the total amount of the pie split by dictators from the receivers, dictators have the ability to avoid the shame that comes from offering a less than equal share of the pie to the recipient. This experiment, played in a two-shot fashion, also allows for analysis of consistency of giving by dictators under the same conditions. Results suggest that dictators do not change the percentage given based on the ability to withhold the total amount from receivers.

Comparing observed and unobserved cooperation through a Fixed Pairing: Iterated Snowdrift Game Model

Abstract: A study of the likelihood of cooperation between ten observed and ten unobserved affiliated undergraduates revealed a hypothesis-consistent conclusion: sixty-percent chance in the observed individual switching their decision after an inconsistent outcome (cooperate, defect) or (defect, cooperate) and a hypothesis-inconsistent conclusion: the unobserved are more likely to cooperate once both players have cooperated. Why is the observed individual more likely to make a riskier decision (defect) after a simultaneous cooperation? Is this a valid contribution to observed cooperation research? Though there was a small and specific sample, we believe the present study will provide insight into the iterated Snowdrift model as well.

The Value of Delayed Gratification

Abstract: Self-control was studied and quantified through the concept of delayed gratification, utilizing economic discounting principles. A survey was used to measure a subject’s decision making when faced with a choice between an immediate and a delayed reward. Subjects exhibited delayed discounting, which was used as an independent variable in attempting to find a correlation between higher discounting and better success in life as measured by the subject’s grade point average. Subjects that exhibited higher rates of discounting could be described as being more patient and this was found to have a positive linear relationship with success. Subjects with higher rates of discounting also tended to major in physical science over social science but exhibited higher rates of stress.
Potato Chips and Consumer’s Erroneous Contrast Beliefs

Abstract: Consumer’s erroneous contrast beliefs are studied through convenience surveys to college students at Ohio Wesleyan University. Three different conditions are applied to students; prediction, concurrent, and retrospective conditions. This study first looked at whether each condition had statistically significant contrast effects on student perception of potato chip flavor enjoyment. Then, each condition was compared to another to see if there existed statistically significant different contrast conditions among each group. The concurrent and retrospective conditions were found to have statistically significant contrast effects. Additionally, the only significant difference between the three conditions was that the retrospective group had greater contrast effects than the predictive group. However, this analysis must be taken with precaution as the predictive group by itself was found to be statistically insignificant for contrast effects. Therefore, further research can be done on studying contrast effects among prediction conditions and in comparison between predictive and retrospective groups.

“Hot hand” v. “Gambler’s fallacy”: Inductions from streaks in probabilistic outcomes

Abstract: Sometimes individuals expect that a streak of comparable independent events will end (depiction of the gambler’s fallacy). However, at other times, they predict that such a streak will endure (belief in the hot hand fallacy). Both these inductions have been partially explained as a consequence of belief in the law of small numbers. It is debated that one factor that discriminates these phenomena is the individual’s belief about the randomness/independence of the procedure generating these events. The participants were provided information about a streak of certain events, but the circumstances were varied in such a manner that the mechanism generating these events differed in how random the participants would perceive it to be. The conjecture was refuted that with less random generating process, the participants were more likely to continue a streak.

Outthinking the Defense: Impact of strategic thinking within a football game

Abstract: This paper explores the possible impact of strategic thinking within a football game. The model this study applies attempts to quantify the presumed strategic skill of a team’s opponent by analyzing the benefits of running either a pass or a run play against a pass defense, mixed defense, and run defense. The variations in the payoffs of these plays and the proportion in which they happen create a strategy that will be the most successful. The proportion of times the offense deviates from this ideal strategy so that the defense cannot properly adapt is the indicator of how strategic the offense perceives the defense to be. Through an analysis of this measure, the strategic ability of the offense is discovered. This study analyzes the strategic abilities of four teams in the National Football League’s NFC North division and will demonstrate that the ability to play more strategically than the opposing team’s defense is significantly correlated to winning games, the total points scored in a game, and the total yards earned in a game, but not the difference between the two team’s scores.